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Summary findings
The  countries  of the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  support  for  reform  will be  limited,  and  a vicious  circle
(MENA)  have lost the geographic  advantage  they  used  to  may  result.
have because  of their  proximity  to rhe European  Union  The  creation  of  the World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)
at a time when  Eastern  Europe  was effectively  closed  to  and  the offer  of the  European  Union  to establish  a Euro-
open  exchange  with  the West.  The  Central  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  Economic  Area  provide  possible
European  countries  are  beginning  to exploit  their  own  institutional  frameworks  to make  a gradual  reform
proximity,  together  with  relatively  low wages  and  strategy  more  credible.  Full participation  in the WTO
significant  stocks  of human  capital,  and  are formidable  could  move  the trade  regime  closer  to "good  practices,"
competitors  with  MENA.  improve  trade  institutions,  help  lock  in trade  reform,
To compete,  the  MENA  countries  must  implement  make  trade  policy  implementation  more  transparent,
more  far-reaching  liberalization,  privatization,  and  diminish  bureaucratic  red tape,  and  force  firms  to go
deregulation.  It has been  a basic  tenet  in MENA  through  GATT-sanctioned  mechanisms  for temporary
countries  that  economic  reform  must  be gradual  to avoid  safeguard  protection.
causing  social  disruption.  This  has often  meant  little  An agreement  with  the European  Union  to establish  a
effort  publicizing  reform  and  mobilizing  political  free trade  and  investment  area  could  offset  some of the
support.  Partial  and  slow  reform  has led to uncertainty  in  WTO's  regulatory  and administrative  loopholes,  could
firms and  households  and  a lack of credibility.  (by providing  financial  transfers)  overcome  resistance  to
The  slower  the  pace of  reform  and  the  less  reform,  and could  ensure  investors  that  MENA
comprehensive  its scope,  the greater  the  gap between  governments  are committed  to far-reaching  integration
MENA's  performance  and  the  rest of the world  is likely  with  the  European  Union.
to become.  Without  a significant  private  sector  supply  But neither  option  is a panacea.  Both  should  be
response  and  inward  foreign  direct  investment,  political  pursued  simultaneously.
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The longer term economic  potential of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has
improved  significantly  in recent years as a result of the progress made in the peace process. The
challenge  facing governments  is to adopt  policies that will allow this potential to be realized  by
fostering  private sector development  and encouraging  export-led  growth.  Many of the countries in
the region have been pursuing attempts  to reduce the economic  role of the state and shift away from
traditional import substitution/infant  industry  protection strategies. While some progress has been
made, the pace of trade policy reform has varied substantially  across countries. In many economies
an anti-export  bias continues  to exist.  This is most vividly illustrated if the recent export growth of
the MENA countries is compared  to that of the Central and Eastern European countries  (CEECs) and
South-east  Asian economies  such as China or Malaysia. Trade data reveal clearly that the CEECs are
well on the way to exploiting  their geographic  proximity to the EU, which in conjunction  with their
relatively low wages and significant  stocks of human  capital makes them formidable  competitors  for
the MENA region.  The geographic  advantage  that the MENA region used to have--because  Eastern
Europe was effectively  closed  to open exchange with the West--has  now disappeared. MENA must
now compete  head-to-head  with the CEECs.  This is indeed a challenge,  as relative labor costs in the
CEECs and MENA are not that different and Eastern Europe is able to exploit sub-contracting  of
manufacturing  products for export to the European  Union to a much greater degree than MENA
countries.
The major policy issue facing the MENA region as a whole is to implement  much more far-
reaching liberalization,  privatization  and deregulation  than has been done up to the present. A basic
tenet of economic  reform efforts in many of the countries  of the region has been that this must not
lead to social disruption. The consequence  has been an insistence  that reform be gradual. This has
sometimes  been complemented  by a  strategy of non-transparency;  little effort being devoted to
publicizing  reform efforts and mobilizing  political support. The result has been uncertainty  on the
part of firms and households,  and a lack of credibility. There is a trade-off  between political
feasibility  of rapid reform efforts and the opportunity  costs of gradualism. The slower the pace of
reform and the less comprehensive  its scope, the larger the gap between  MENA's performance  and
that of the rest of the world is likely to become.  The absence of a significant  private sector supply
response  and inward foreign  direct investment  will in turn limit political support for reform. A
vicious circle may result. What is needed  is an institutional  framework  that enhances  the credibility
of a gradual reform strategy. The creation of the WTO and the EU offer to establish a Euro-
Mediterranean  Economic  Area are very relevant in this regard.
The WTO offers an opportunity  to adopt better trade policies and improve  trade institutions.
Many countries in the region were not GATT contracting  parties, and are therefore not Members of
the WTO (which entered into force in January 1995). Whether or not a GATT contracting  party, all
countries in the region will be affected  by the liberalization  of markets agreed to in the Uruguay
round.  Existing GATT members will also be confronted  with a substantial  number of policy and
institutional  changes  that are required under the WTO (e.g., on customs valuation,  product standards,
services  and intellectual  property protection). Membership  of the WTO can do much to move trade
regimes closer towards 'good practices'.  It provides a cheap and effective  mechanism  to lock in trade
policy reforms and improve  the transparency  of policy implementation. By adopting  and abiding by
the rules of the game for the administration  of trade laws and policies, current problems associated
with bureaucratic  red tape can diminish significantly.  By binding tariffs at applied levels, the scope
ifor domestic firms to lobby directly for an increase in a specific  tariff is greatly reduced, if not
eliminated. This will force firms to go through the GATT-sanctioned  mechanisms  for temporary
safeguard  protection. If well-designed  these will not encourage  direct rent seeking expenditures  or
constitute  a disincentive  for firms to undertake  the investment  and adjustment  efforts needed  to
enhance  their productivity.
A problem associated  with the WTO is that its loopholes  may substantially  reduce the
potential  beneficial 'credibility  effect'.  An agreement  with the EU to establish  a free trade and
investment  area can help to offset many of the WTO's weaknesses  with respect to regulatory regimes
and administrative  practices. It can also help overcome  existing resistance  to reform through the
provision of financial  transfers.  Most importantly,  an EU link can provide assurances  to investors
that although  progress towards complete  liberalization  of trade will be gradual--as  determined  by the
negotiated  transition period--  MENA governments  are committed  to far-reaching  integration  with the
EU.  Although  the EU offers a more binding and more credible road map than the WTO, an
agreement  with the EU is not a panacea. It is particularly important  that trade and other barriers to
competition  that affect non-EU firms are reduced substantially  in order to limit the potential  trade
diversion  costs of a preferential  agreement  with the EU.  Governments  are strongly encouraged  to
reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade against the rest of the world at the same time, and at the
same pace, as barriers are reduced  vis-a-vis EU suppliers. The additional  adjustment  costs of doing
so are limited, while the potential  gains from liberalization  will be greatly enhanced.
ii1.  Introduction
The longer term economic  potential  of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has
improved  significantly  in recent years as the peace process expands opportunities  for investment  and
intra-regional  trade and cooperation. The challenge  facing many governments  is to adopt policies that
will allow this potential to be realized  by fostering  private sector development  and encouraging
export-led  growth.  Many of the countries  in the region have been pursuing attempts  to reduce the
economic  role of the state and shift away from traditional import substitution/infant  industry
protection  strategies. While some progress has been made, the pace of trade policy reform has varied
substantially  across countries. In many economies  an anti-export  bias continues  to exist.  The gradual
and tentative nature of reform has also led to credibility  problems in some countries, limiting  private
sector supply response.
Within the MENA region' a distinction  must be made between  North African countries  such
as Morocco and Tunisia, Middle Eastem countries such as Egypt or Jordan, and the Arab peninsula.
Morocco and Tunisia have made more progress in reform than other countries in the region. This is
reflected  in the growth of non-traditional  exports.  The share of phosphates  and olive oil in total
exports of Morocco and Tunisia, respectively,  declined  from around 45 percent in 1980 to less than
20 percent in 1992  (World Bank, 1994). However, the region as a whole has been lagging  behind
ongoing  global policy developments  in the trade and investment  area.  This is most vividly illustrated
if the recent export  performance  of the MENA countries is compared  to that of the Central and
Eastern European  countries. The major policy issue facing the MENA region as a whole is to
implement  much more far-reaching  liberalization,  privatization  and deregulation  than has been done
up to the present.
The creation  of the WTO with its three constituent  elements--a  revised and significantly
expanded  GATT, a new General Agreement  on Trade in Services  (GATS), and a new agreement  on
' MENA  incorporates  Morocco,  Tunisia,  Algeria,  Libya,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Israel,  Lebanon,  Syria,  Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi  Arabia,  Yemen,  Oman,  UAE,  Bahrain,  and Qatar. It does  not include  Turkey,  Iran and African
countries  such  Mauritania,  Somalia,  and Sudan. Iraq and Libya  are not captured  in the analysis  that  follows
due to lack  of data.Trade-related  Intellectual  Property Rights (TRIPs)--increases  the challenge  facing governments. The
implementation  of the Uruguay  Round agreements  will confront the MENA countries  with greater
competition  on third markets. At the same time, the WTO offers an opportunity  to adopt better trade
policies and improve trade institutions. Many countries  in the region were not GATT contracting
parties, and are therefore not Members of the WTO (which  entered into force in January 1995).
They include Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Non-
membership  of the WTO is likely to make it more difficult  to attract the foreign direct investment
(FDI) and technological  know-how  needed to diversify  production  and compete  on world markets.
Algeria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were at the time of writing involved in accession  talks.  Bahrain,
Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, and the UAE were GATT members by the end of
the Uruguay  Round. Whether or not a GATT contracting  party, all countries in the region will be
affected  by the liberalization  of trade agreed to in the Uruguay round.  Existing GATT members will
also be confronted  with a substantial  number of policy and institutional  changes  that are required
under the WTO (e.g., on customs valuation,  product standards, services  and intellectual  property
protection).
This paper discusses  the trade policy status quo in the region, the need for change, and the
possible role of external  institutions  in facilitating  reform.  Section  2 starts with a brief discussion  of
current trade policy in MENA countries. Section  3 goes on to use trade data to illustrate how the
policy stances  have inhibited  private investment  in export-oriented  production  by comparing  MENA's
recent export performance  with that of the Central and Eastern European  countries (CEECs).  Section
4 discusses  the economic  impact  of the Uruguay round, the policy and institutional  implications  of the
WTO, and what Membership  can do to move trade regimes closer towards 'good practices'.  An
important  element supporting  the export growth of the CEECs has been the Association  Agreements
negotiated  with the European Union (EU) in 1992. Similar agreements  are being negotiated  by
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Israel.  The Commission  of the European Communities  has
proposed  that these become part of a wider Europe-Mediterranean  Economic  Area.  This offers a
window  of opportunity  to pursue further reforms in a setting that could help governments  to overcome
2existing credibility  problems. Section 5 describbs  the maiAl  elements  of a likely Association
Agreement  with the EU, and discusses  how such an agreement  could help overcome some of the
constraints  on adoption  of more market and private sector-friendly  regulatory regimes  in the region.
Section  6 concludes.
2.  Current  Trade Policies  in MENA
Aspects  of the trade regime that inhibit the competitiveness  of firms located  in many MENA
countries include relatively  high average rates of effective  protection, substantial  dispersion of such
protection  across industries  and nontransparent  implementation  of trade policies. High tariffs and
associated  'red tape' constitute  a tax on export production, both directly by raising input costs and
indirectly  by putting pressure on the real exchange  rate, thereby reducing  the competitiveness  of firms
on world markets. High levels of effective  protection  also provide  local firms with a disincentive  to
attempt  to penetrate world markets, as profit rates are often higher on sheltered home markets. One
result has been a somewhat  dualistic  economic  structure, with export-oriented  firms having few
linkages  with the rest of the economy, and most firms continuing  to concentrate  on the local market.
Export production  in the highly protected  environment  would require well-functioning  duty drawback
and temporary admission  mechanisms. These are generally  not available.
Agricultural  trade tends to be significantly  distorted in many countries in the region. A well
known  example  is Saudi Arabia, which has pursued a policy of large scale subsidization  and import
protection  to support domestic  production  of cereals and oilseeds. Wheat production  rose from 3,000
tons in the mid 1970s  to more than 4 million tons in 1992, making it more than self-sufficient. Over
half of wheat  production is exported. For wheat alone  direct subsidies  are some $2.5 billion per year
(Goldin  and Kherallah, 1995). Subsidization  of agriculture  is much less significant  in other MENA
countries, but many governments  intervene  through import quotas, licensing  or bans on specific
products, high average tariffs for "sensitive"  commodities,  state monopolies  for imports  and
distribution in conjunction  with price controls, and input subsidies (including  charges for water and
energy that often do not reflect scarcity values).
3There are often numerous  tariff bands in the tariff schedules  of MENA countries. Jordan, for
example,  has 33 different rates, ranging  from 0 to 320 percent.  In Egypt, rates generally  range from
0 to 70 percent, although  tariffs on motor vehicles  may rise to 160  percent.  Tariffs in Morocco and
Tunisia are lower, in the former country ranging  from 0-35 percent, and in the latter varying between
10-43  percent.  Annex Table 1 compares  average unweighted  tariffs for a number of MENA countries
with those of countries in other parts of the world that have pursued liberalization  programs since the
mid-1980s. Average rates for the four MENA countries reported are in the 25-30 percent range, and
have declined  less than in many comparator  countries in other regions. While lower than the average
rate in the reported South Asian countries,  they are substantially  higher than the average tariff that is
now applied in many Latin American countries. Moreover, they have been declining  more slowly.
This is perhaps the most important  conclusion  to be drawn, as levels of nominal tariffs are of course
difficult  to compare  across countries.
Table 1 reports data on collected  tariff revenue as a share of imports. This is more revealing
than the average statutory rate, as it better reflects the actual tax burden on trade by allowing  for the
existence  of exemptions  and possible biases in customs classification  and valuation. The unweighted
average  burden in MENA countries is about 17 percent, abstracting  from the countries in the Gulf
region who pursue a zero or low tariff policy (Bahrain, Oman, UAE). This is more than 3 times
higher than the average for the seven comparator  countries listed.
The converse  of the high tariff burden is that import duties account for a much higher share
of government  revenue in MENA countries  than in countries  that pursue a more outward-oriented
economic  strategy. The average share of revenue  generated  by trade taxes (excluding  stamp duties) in
the sample  of MENA countries is 20 percent, that for the comparators  only 6 percent.  Alternative,
less distorting sources of revenue  must be developed  in the context of further efforts to liberalize
trade flows. The expected  weakness  of oil-related  revenues  in the medium term--given  sluggish
demand  and the anticipated  increase in supply  following  the recovery/re-entry  of producers such as
Iraq and Russia (World Bank, l995)--may  perversely induce  a greater reliance  on trade taxes.  This
should be resisted, priority instead  being given to increasing  indirect taxes, broadening  the tax base,
4and reducing  subsidies  (especially  those that encourage  environmental  degradation  and inefficient  use
of scarce resources).
Table 1:  Trade Taxes in MENA  Countries,  1993
Share of Import  Share of "Other"  Average  Collected
Duties  in Total  Taxes in Total  Tariff
Government  Import  Tax  (revenue/
Revenue  Revenue  imports)
Morocco  17.7  52  17.5
Tunisia  28.3  46  18.7
Egypt  10.0  8  14.9
Jordan  35.9  40  17.8
Syria  10.0  25  16.4
Oman  3.2  3.0
UAE
Yemen  20.2  3  19.1+
Bahrain  9.2  4.0
Israel  1.0  1.2
Turkey  4.4  78  2.5
Mexico (1990)  5.1  4.8
Chile  9.9  9.7
Indonesia  5.2  4.9
Malaysia  13.6  31  4.9
Korea  4.8  -_  4.4
Notes: -- zero  or negligible; Excludes  stamp  duties;  + Valued  at the average  parallel  market  exchange  rate,
the average  collection  rate was  around  8 percent. The nominal  rate of 19%  is indicative  of the Government's
intentions,  however.
Source: IMF Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook,  1994;  International  Financial  Statistics,  1994.
Effective  rates of protection  of manufacturing  generally  exceed the level of nominal protection
by a substantial  margin.  In addition to the nominal  tariffs, imports  are often also subject to a variety
of additional  taxes. In the case of Jordan, these include a 5% import license fee, a tax earmarked  for
universities  (4%), another tax for municipalities  (2%), an additional  consolidated  fee of 6%, a
customs service fee of 0.2%, and a surcharge  of either 3% on non-zero  rated goods or 5% if no
5tariffs are applied.  In Yemen,  over ten additional  taxes and surcharges  were imposed  on imports.
Morocco imposes a 'special import levy' of 15 percent on most goods (capital  goods face a 10 percent
levy); Tunisia levies surcharges  varying between 10 and 30 percent on a range of products that
compete  with domestic  production; Egypt imposes  a one percent statistical  tax, a 'service fee' of 2
percent for goods subject to import duties of less than 30 percent, a 5 percent fee for other products,
as well a number  of stamp duties.  Such additional  fees on imports reduce the transparency  of the
tariff structure, especially  as they may not be applied to all products.  Table 1 illustrates the
importance  of "other" taxes on trade in the MENA region.
The use of quantitative  restrictions  has been declining. In Morocco, the production coverage
of quantitative  restrictions  has fallen to zero, down from 50 percent in the mid 1980s; in Tunisia only
20 percent of local production  benefited  from such barriers in 1994, down from 94 percent in the mid
1980s  (Lahouel, 1995). Egypt has also eliminated  most import quotas.  Nontariff  barriers to imports
remain prevalent, however. Many industrial products, including  processed  foodstuffs, are subject to
licensing  requirements  related to the enforcement  of health and safety  standards. These licenses  tend
to be granted by the relevant Ministry (e.g., Health for pharmaceuticals,  Agriculture  for food,
Telecommunications  for telecommunications  equipment,  Interior for chemicals). More generally, all
imported products may require an import license (e.g., Jordan, Yemen). Import licenses for products
subject  to mandatory  standards  are often only granted once products have been approved  by the
relevant  Ministry/agency. Such approval often  requires inspection  of the goods at Customs, imposing
costs on importers, delaying customs clearance  and subjecting importers  to unnecessary  uncertainty.
Nonrecognition  of internationally  known certification  bodies or international  standards--as  is
the case in Jordan and Egypt for example--raises  costs for importers  and consumers, and reduces the
incentives  for enterprises  to employ the services of certification  entities and increase their awareness
of the importance  of quality standards  in international  trade.  Current practices and procedures  have
led to claims that standards  are being used as technical  barriers to trade.  Quality control (inspection)
by the General  Organization  for Export and Import Control (GOEIC)  in Egypt is illustrative. It
inspects  a sample of every consignment  of goods entering Egypt that is on a list of products subject  to
6quality control.  Some 1,500 tariff lines (25 percent of the tariff schedule)  is subject to quality
control.  Internationally  recommended  methods  of testing and certification  are allegedly ignored, and
internationally  recognized  quality and certification  marks (such as that of the European  Union) may
not be accepted. Even if international  standards  have been adopted  as the basis for domestic  product
standards, the relevant  criteria for ascertaining  whether  they have been met may not be clearly defined
in the appropriate  regulations  or statutes.
Administrative  procedures  and requirements  associated  with importing more generally  are
often burdensome,  increasing  the cost of imports substantially,  and thereby lowering  the
competitiveness  of MENA firms on world markets. Many government  bodies can be involved  in the
import process, either collecting  taxes or import duties, or authorizing  the release of imports.
Examples  of the bodies involved  in Egypt include  Customs, the Ministry of Health (pharmaceutical
and medical devices),  the Ministry of Supply (wheat),  the General Organization  for Veterinary
Services  (Ministry of Agriculture),  the General Organization  for Plant Protection and Quarantine
(Ministry of Agriculture),  the Atomic Energy Organization,  the Industrial Control Authority  (Ministry
of Industry), and the General Organization  for Export and Import Control.
Customs clearance  is frequently  cumbersome. In Lebanon, 18 signatures  are required before
goods can be released. A customs  broker, once all customs forms and acccompanying  documentation
are obtained  (delivery order, packaging  list, origin certificate, copy of bill of lading)  needs to get
signatures  from officials  to: certify that goods are allowable  for import; that the Israeli boycott is not
violated; obtain a log book number; confirm  that the foregoing  three steps have been taken; identify a
"verificateur"  for the valuation  of goods; comfirm conformity  of documents  (by verificateur  and the
chief controller); obtain an appointment  for inspection  of goods; select a sample, if necessary  for
valuation/classification;  determine the calculation  of the duties due by the auditor;  confirmation  of
the assessment  by the assistant  Department  Head; confirmation  by the Port Authority  that a payment
order has been prepared; approval  by a committee  of the paperwork; receipt  of payment by cashier;
registry of payment;  provide a receipt; guarantee  the removal of the goods; and release of the
container  to the shipping agent or importer (World Bank, 1995b). In other countries in the region,
7procedures  can be substantially  more complicated,  insofar as import licensing  is required and product
standards are enforced.
The many administrative  controls can delay customs clearance  by anything  from a few days to
several  weeks. Valuation  procedures  in particular give rise to substantial  uncertainty  on the part of
importers, as Customs  generally  expects  underinvoicing. Customs officials in Jordan, for example,
rely on price lists and declared  values of 'bona fide' importers  of particular goods to determine the
value of goods. In Morocco, reference  prices are used to protect local production. If importers are
found to have engaged in underinvoicing,  fines can be imposed  that are a multiple of the tariff that
applies, and may be a multiple  of the value of the goods concemed. Customs officials in a number of
countries is allowed to keep between  20 and 40 percent of the additional revenue  thus generated,
creating an incentive  to find underinvoicing.
An important  factor raising the costs of exporters in MENA countries are the level of port
service fees for handling  and storage  of goods, and the quality of the services  provided. The
companies  that provide  port services such as loading  and unloading  of containers on ships, handling
of containers, storage and warehousing  tend to be public monopolies. The cost per tone of handling a
container  in the port of Alexandria  is reported  to be some two to three times the price incurred in
other ports around the Mediterranean. Egyptian exporters  interviewed  by a recent Bank team
indicated  that the additional  costs associated  with the high fees charged by these companies  raise costs
by over 10 percent.  A lack of competition  is also reported to prevail with respect to insurance  premia
charged for trade coverage, which are higher than those confronting  Egypt's competitors  on world
markets.  Such costs reduce the competitiveness  of Egyptian  firms by raising  prices and reducing
profits.  In contrast to tariffs on intermediate  inputs, the extra costs associated  with customs
clearance, quality control, customs valuation,  and the monopoly  service providers in the ports cannot
be recovered  through a duty drawback  and similar schemes. They constitute, therefore, a major
disadvantage  for firms seeking  to produce  for export, and are a major disincentive  for foreign firms
that might be interested  in investing in export-oriented  production. Similar observations  apply to
many other countries in the region.
8Many of the constraints  to export development  that are embedded  in the trade policy system
reflect  the legacy of the 'ancien regime' which involved  large scale public sector participation  in and
control of the economy. Some of the government  organizations  that impose a significant  transactions
costs on traders had a mandate  to control trade in the past.  Structural reform programs incrementally
whittled away the responsibilities  of many of these agencies of 'control'.  They often continue to
exist, however, and have been creative in attempting  to continue to pursue their traditional role.  One
explanation  for the increased  profile given to the enforcement  of product standards and phyto-sanitary
requirements  in the trade regime of some of the MENA countries  (e.g., Egypt) is that this legitimizes
the continuation  of the activities of 'control' agencies.
Many MENA countries  have concluded  preferential  trade agreements  with one another.
Trade flows covered by these agreements  benefit from complete  or partial exemptions  from tariffs.
The agreements  pertain mostly to agricultural  and raw materials. If industrial products are concerned,
there is often a minimum  local value added criterion of 40 percent.  Many of these agreements  were
negotiated  in the 1960s  and 1970s. However, some are recent.  A 1992  agreement between  Lebanon
and Jordan is illustrative. It exempts animals, agricultural  produce, fruits and vegetables  from all
customs duties and other taxes (i.e., surcharges). A positive list of industrial products is subject to a
preferential  tariff rate (two-thirds  of the regular rate), but remain subject to all surcharges. A total of
US $5 million  of goods may enter duty and surcharge  free for purposes of exhibitions. The
agreement  also specifies  that sales taxes will be levied on a national  treatment basis.  Given their
nature, these protocol agreements  are unlikely to benefit the countries involved. As many MENA
countries  have similar factor endowments,  the scope for intra-industry  trade is limited unless
industries  start to specialize  and compete  on world markets. The partial coverage of the agreements
prevents  rather than stimulates  trade flows between Arab states.
The foregoing  is not to say that no progress has been made since the late 1980s  in trade
liberalization. Many countries  have implemented  reforms that reduce anti-export  bias.  But much
remains to be done, especially  because  competitor  countries  are moving faster. The efforts
undertaken  in many MENA countries  in recent years provides a good basis on which to move further
9towards integration  into the world economy. The trade-off  in this regard is between  the apparent
political infeasibility  of rapid reform efforts and the opportunity  costs of gradualism. The slower the
pace of reform and the less comprehensive  its scope, the larger will be the gap between MENA and
the rest of the world is likely to become. Greater gaps can also be expected  between  the 'first
movers' in MENA such as Morocco or Tunisia and 'followers' such as Egypt or Jordan.  Unilateral
reform efforts in the latter countries  have so far been inadequate  to induce a  significant  private sector
supply response  or inward flows of foreign direct investment  (as opposed to short-term liquid capital).
This is a major problem, as a supply response is crucial in terms of generating  support for reform and
inducing  governments  to continue reform efforts.
The MENA region has a window  of opportunity  in the next few years to implement  further
structural reforms.  Two developments  are of particular importance  in this connection. First, the
external  environment  is expected  to be relatively  good in the coming years, with most major markets
predicted  to show substantial  growth. Recovery  of economic  activity will increase  global demand for
MENA output, especially  oil.  The establishment  of peace in the region should also do much to attract
the potential interest of investors. What is needed is an institutional  framework  that enhances  the
credibility of a gradual reform strategy by establishing  a longer term, credible 'vision' of future
economic  policies and relationships  in the region. The second development,  the creation  of the WTO
and the EU offer to establish  a Euro-Mediterranean  Economic  Area is very relevant  in this regard.
The problems  constraining  export-led  growth in MENA countries  are as much institutional  in
nature as policy-specific. Changes in policy--while  desirable and necessary--must  therefore be
complemented  by a reduction in, and strengthening  of, implementing  institutions. Reductions  in the
regulatory  and administrative  burdens confronting  the private sector can be achieved  relatively rapidly
at low cost.  The faster they are achieved  the better firms will be able to handle the reductions in
protection  as they are implemented. Significant  up front improvements  in administration  of
regulations  and elimination  of 'harassment' opportunities  will also help to enhance the credibility of
the Government. Given the frequency  with which the issue of the cost and quality of support services
is mentioned  by exporters  as reducing  their ability  to compete  on world markets, priority should also
10be given  to enhancing  the efficiency  of the service sector.  This will require liberalization  of access  to
service markets  by foreign  providers, as well as privatization  and demonopolization. The faster this
can be done, and the more far-reaching  the market opening, the better domestic firms will be able to
handle import competition  and diversify into world markets.
3.  Trade Performance  and Reform:  Comparing  the CEECs  and MENA
A basic tenet of economic  reform efforts in many of the countries of the region is that this
must not lead to social disruption. The consequence  has been an insistence  that reform be gradual.
This has sometimes  been complemented  by a  strategy of non-transparency;  little effort being devoted
to publicizing  reform efforts and mobilizing  political support.  The result has been uncertainty  on the
part of firms and households,  and a lack of credibility. Traders in economies  such as Egypt or
Jordan often report their perception  that 'little has changed' with respect to trade policy and
administration  (e.g., customs clearance). Insofar as a 'fear of reform' exists, the key need is to
ensure that adjustment  costs are relatively  short-term and manageable,  and to convince important
interest groups that these costs will be greatly offset by longer term benefits. Compensation  schemes
may be required  during the transition for certain groups. The experience  of the Central and Eastern
European  countries (CEECs) with their reform efforts are of interest in this connection. They suggest
that far-reaching  reforms can have a dramatic impact  on economic  performance  by inducing a
reorientation  and restructuring  of production  and trade to create and exploit competitive  advantages,
in the process generating  private sector employment  opportunities  and fostering  growth.
This Section  briefly describes  recent developments  in trade with the European Union, with a
view to explore the possible impact  of a significant  reduction in protection. The data show that most
of the CEECs have been successful  in reorienting  and greatly expanding  exports to the EU.  While
this is a somewhat  "unfair" comparison,  given the greater level of industrialization  and human capital
that existed in Eastern Europe, the parallels  between the two regions are close enough that a
comparison  is informative. Many countries in both regions start reforms in the late 1980s;  the level
of state intervention  in MENA, while not as high as in the CEECs was quite significant;  and both
11were directly affected  by the collapse  of CMEA-based  trade.  One noteworthy  difference  between  the
region is that the CEECs that were GATT members  were constrained  in their ability to raise tariffs,
having bound these at low levels upon accession  (tariffs were not relevant in the centralized  trade
context). Once central planning  was abolished,  CEEC governments  started out with very low tariffs
and were constrained  in their ability to raise them by GATT compensation  requirements. 2 This turned
out to be an advantage,  facilitating  the negotiation  of an Association  Agreement  with the EU (see
below), and illustrating  one of the main potential  benefits of GATT membership.
Data on per capita exports of MENA countries, to the world and to the EU, reveal that
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MENA countries  have not been very dynamic in terms of non-oil, non-traditional  exports.  Per capita
2 As a result, several countries  used import surcharges  during the initial adjustment process.  Such temporary
surcharges  are permitted under GATT, but are subject to conditions  (demonstration  that measures  are necessary
to deal with a balance  of payments  problem) and surveillance.
12exports for the region as a whole are around US $200, and have risen slightly in recent years (Figure
1).  The share of exports going to the EU did not increase in the  1989-93  period, however.  MENA
exports to the EU are largely due to North Africa, which exports most of its manufactured  goods to
Europe. For the Middle Eastern countries the EU is much less important, except for Israel (Figure
2).  If MENA is compared  to the CEECs, it can be seen that although aggregate  exports of the
CEECs to the world stagnated  between 1989  and 1993--reflecting  a large drop in output and exports
as enterprises  adjusted  to price liberalization  and the demnise  of the CMEA--the Eastern European
countries  managed to re-orient their trade quite substantially. Whereas some 29 percent of CEEC
exports went to the EU in 1989, the proportion had risen to 52 percent in 1993. The average annual
growth rate of exports to the EU (18.7 percent) compares  starkly with the 2.5 percent growth
performance  of MENA countries.
Figure 2 presents data on per capita  exports of non-oil/gas  products by country.  Noteworthy
is the export  performance  of Israel, which is approaching  the $3,000 per capita mark.  This compares
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13to some $500 per capita  on average for the CEECs, $1,000 for the Czech Republic, and exports in
the $150-250  range for Morocco, Syria, and Lebanon; $400 for Tunisia, and $550 for the UAE.
Kuwait has the highest  per capita exports of manufactures  in the region after Israel--mostly
petrochemicals. Algeria and Egypt have very low per capita export figures; the former less than $20,
the latter $30.  Per capita exports of non-oil  products to the world over 1989-93  have been falling for
Egypt (minus 3.5 percent per year), Jordan (minus 5 percent), Syria and the UAE (rninus I and 0.5
percent, respectively). Exports to the EU declined  for Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon.
Table 2: Non-Oil  Exports  to EU, 1989 and 1993 (ECU million)
Country  Value  Market  Share  Growth
________-  Rate
1989  1993  1989  1993
MENA  9,940  12,010  2.68  2.83  4.8
Jordan  86  268  0.02  0.06  32.9
Lebanon  100  66  0.03  0.02  -10.0
Syria  90  177  0.02  0.04  18.5
Israel  3,014  3,282  0.81  0.77  2.1
Egypt  790  790  0.21  0.19  0.0
Morocco  2,612  3,135  0.70  0.74  4.7
Tunisia  1,596  2,343  0.43  0.55  10.1
Algeria  219  151  0,06  0.04  -8.86
Saudi Arabia  890  1,057  0.24  0.25  4.4
Kuwait  131  149  0.04  0.04  3.3
U.A.E.  414  593  0.11  0.14  9.4
CEEC  10,336  19,145  2.79  4.51  16.7
Source: EUROSTAT.
Total non-oil/gas  exports by the CEECs to the EU rose by 16.7 per cent per year on average
between 1989  and 1993, from ECU 10 billion in 1989 to 19 billion in 1993 (Table 2).  In this period,
14total EU imports rose by only 2.1 per cent per year, while world trade increased  by 3.7 per cent per
year.  The CEECs therefore substantially  increased  their market share in the EU.  For the six
countries that have signed Association  Agreements--Bulgaria,  the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania and the Slovak Republic--total  import penetration  rose from 2.8 per cent in 1989 to 4.5 per
cent in 1993. Individual  country market share growth was often substantially  higher.  Both Poland
and the Czech and Slovak Republics  doubled their share of the EU market.
Some 65 percent of MENA's market share in the EU is oil- and natural resource-related,
mostly reflecting  exports by Algeria, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (oil and related natural resource
exports account  for 90-95 percent of total shipments  to the EU for these countries). Agricultural
produce  represents  another 6 percent of total MENA exports to the EU.  Other (manufactured)
products therefore account for less than one-third of total exports to the EU.  Textiles  and clothing
account for the lion's share of manufactured  exports (12.1 percent of the total).  MENA's share of
non-oil  exports to the EU is very small, standing  at only 2.8 percent in 1993  (Table 2).  While it has
been more dynamic than total exports in recent years--reflecting  the decline/stagnation  in oil prices--
the comparison  with the export performance  of the CEECs remains very striking. 3 In 1989 the
CEECs and MENA exported about the same amount of manufactured  goods to the EU.  By 1993,
CEEC exports had almost doubled, in the process substantially  increasing  their share of the EU
market.  MENA's share of the EU market, in contrast, has remained  constant.
Jordan appears  to be the best performer, but this is largely a reflection  of what appears to be
a one-off sale of assets: virtually all the increase occurs in 1993, and consists of "exports" of aircraft-
-a return of two leased Airbusses--and  gold.  Tunisia, Morocco and Israel--the  three MENA countries
closest to concluding  an Association  Agreement  with the EU--are  the largest exporters of
manufactures  to the EU, with Tunisia having the best growth performance  in recent yhears.  Much of
the growth of exports of manufactures  consists  of textiles and clothing in MENA exports to the EU
(Annex Table 2).  For countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, and the UAE, this is a very
3 The  aggregate  exports--oil  and non-oil--of  oil/gas-dependent  countries  such  Algeria,  Egypt,  Kuwait  and the
UAE  to the EU fell between  1989  and 1993.
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important  sector.  The same applies for Turkey, which is revealed  as a serious competitor  for MENA.
Noteworthy  is the growth in the relative importance  of garments  for the UAE. Much of this is likely
to reflect a transhipment  activity induced  by MFA quotas on East and South Asian countries. For the
region as a whole, garments account for 12 percent of total exports, as compared to 16.6 percent for
the CEECs as a group.  Of the CEECs, Poland is the largest exporter of clothing, shipping about the
same amount as Morocco  and Tunisia (however, this represents  only 17 percent of its total exports to
the EU).
16A measure of total change in the structure of exports to the EU is summarized  in Figure 3.4
The relative changes  in the magnitude  of exports of specific  commodities  are much higher on average
for the CEECs than for other countries. All the CEECs register values  that are above 1, implying
above average change. While not as high as China, the CEECs reveal substantially  more 'dynamism'
than MENA.  On average, about three time more 'change' occurred in the CEECs exports to the EU
than in that of MENA.  Another revealing  indicator  of differences  across countries is the change in
trade structure as reflected  in changes  of the relative importance  of commodities  over time.  Table 3
reports data on the change in the relative importance  of "traditional"  products in exports to the EU
over 1989-93. Traditional products are defined as product categories  accounting  for at least ECU 3
million of exports to the EU in 1989. The first two columns  of Table 3 compare the value and share
of such items in 1989  with the value and share of these same items in 1993. There is a wide variance
between MENA countries. Algeria and Syria basically  show no change: the products that accounted
for the lion's share of exports in 1989 were the same in 1993. Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are
in the same category, although  here there is some diversification. Major changes  occur in Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and the UAE.  Of these countries, Jordan is best disregarded as
the data are heavily influenced  by one-time  exports of gold and aircraft. In Israel, Morocco, Tunisia
and the UAE, products that in 1989 accounted  for between 70 and 90 percent of exports, contributed
only 50 to 60 percent of total exports in 1993. The converse  of this is that exports of products that
were less than ECU 3 million in 1989  expanded  rapidly, registering growth rates varying from 20 to
40 percent per year.
4The  measure  used is:  .I it
where  a, is the value  of exports  of an 8-digit  tariff  line item  at point  t and  t-i,  respectively,  and K is the  number
of commodities  exported. This measure  treats  increases  and  decreases  symmetrically.  It is intended  to give  an
impression  of 'how  much' change  occurred  in exports. For  ease  of comparison,  the figures  are expressed  as a
function  of the mean  change  in trade structure  for the sample  of countries.
17Table 3: Share  of 'Traditional'  Products  in Total Exports  to EU, 1989-93
(ECU millfion  and percentage)
8 Digit Products  > =3  million ECU in 1989  8 Digit Products  <  3 milHon ECU  in 1989
1989  1993  Gr.  Rate  1989  1993  Gr.  Rate
Algeria  4821  4052  4.25%  81  476  55.60%
98.35%  89.50%  1.65%  10.50%
Egypt  2259  1809  -5.41%  179  406  22.76%
92.67%  81.68%  7.33%  18.32%
Israel  2268  1804  -5.56%  767  1550  19.21%
74.72%  53.79%  25.28%  46.21%
Jordan  44  62  9.06%  46  206  45.69%
49.14%  23.28%  50.86%  76.72%
Kuwait  2661  1713  -10.42%  56  84  10.67%
97.94%  95.33%  2.06%  4.67%
Lebanon  37  12  -23.96%  63  54  -3.84%
36.76%  18.52%  63.24%  81.48%
Morocco  2202  2008  -2.28%  466  1187  26.32%
82.53%  62.85%  17.47%  37.15%
S. Arabia  6246  8204  7.05%  136  943  62.41%
97.88%  89.69%  2.12%  10.31%
Syria  735  1559  20.68%  38  93  24.91%
95.08%  94.39%  4.92%  5.61%
Tunisia  1617  1473  -2.30%  360  1013  29.56%
81.80%  59.24%  18.20%  40.76%
U A E.  1397  391  -27.25%  117  438  39.13%
92.27%  47.16%  7.73%  52.84%
MENA  25083  24795  -0.29%  1513  4742  33.06%
94.31%  83.95%  5.69%  16.05%
CEEC  9827  11706  4.47%  2136  8325  40.5%
82.14%  58.44%  17.86%  41.56%
* Percentages are the share of a country's  total exports in a given year.
Source: Calculated  from the COMEXT  database.
18While a number of countries in the region have therefore shown dynamism  in terms of
diversifying  their export base, they are lagging  behind the CEECs.  The relative importance  of new
products (defined  as commodities  that were not exported in 1989 but were shipped in 1993)  and
"expired"  products (those that were exported in 1989, but had disappeared  in 1993)  is about half that
of the CEECs.  Infornation on the number of commodities  sold to the EU gives a similar picture.
The CEECs greatly expanded  the number  of 8-digit tariff line items exported  to the EU.  The Czech
and Slovak Republic  stands out in particular in this regard, increasing  the number of lines exported
from 3,915 (or 41.6 percent of all the goods imported  by the EU) in 1989 to 6,001 in 1993 (61.5
percent of all lines imported). All the CEECs expand  the diversity of their exports to the EU
significantly. MENA countries, in contrast, tended  to expand  the number of tariff lines exported to
the EU during this four year period by only a few percentage  points.  Moreover, the absolute  number
of items exported to the EU by countries  such as Israel or Turkey in 1993 was significantly  less than
that of the CEECs, whereas it was about the same in 1989. One conclusion  suggested by this
development  is that much of the trade that is occurring  between the EU and the CEECs is intra-
industry.
Intra-industry  trade has been expanding  very rapidly between  the CEECs and the EU (Figure
4).  Given the importance  of natural resource exports, for MENA as a whole, intra-industry  trade is
quite low and relatively  constant over time.  It is significant  only for Israel, followed  by Tunisia.
There is therefore great scope for fostering  such trade by liberalizing  access to markets. Intra-
industry trade is important  because it is one mechanism  through which transfers of technology  can
occur.  To stay within the context of trade with the EU, the Europe Agreements  with the CEECs
have created  incentives  for EU suppliers/retailers  to engage in so-called  outward processing trade
(OPT). This consists  of shipping components  or assemblies  to a CEEC where further processing
occurs.  The processed  good is then exported  back to the EU supplier/retailer. Such processing  trade
benefits from liberal access to the EU, and has been used intensively  for sectors such as garments,
electrical  machinery  and furniture. As part of the subcontracting  that is involved, EU counterparts
will often provide designs, monitor quality, take care of marketing,  etc.  This is a good way for firms
19in partner countries  to reduce the costs and risks associated  with development  of export markets,
while at the same time obtaining know-how  from suppliers. OPT is frequently restricted, at least in
the initial stages, to labor intensive, low value added activities. These can, however, create
significant  employment.
In the period following  the implementation  of the agreements  with the CEECs, exports after
outward processing  accounted  for about 18 percent of total CEEC exports to the EU in 1993, up from
10 percent in 1989. For Romania, processing  activities generated  30 percent of exports to the EU in
1993. In contrast, exports to the EU of processed  goods represented  only 1.7 percent of total MENA
exports in 1993, a share that has remained  constant since 1989  (Table 4).  Most of the processing
occurs in leather/footwear,  clothing, electrical  machinery,  precision instruments  and furniture.  OPT
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20accounts  for a very substantial  share of the growth in exports from the CEECs to the EU (Table 5).
In contrast, it plays a very minor role in MENA, the two exceptions  being Morocco and Tunisia.
Table 4:  Exports  After Outward  Processing  (Share  in Total exports  to EU)
CEEC  MENA
1989  1993  1989  1993
Total  10.4  17.9  1.6  1.7
Leather  38.9  34.5  8.0  8.5
Garments  60.8  74.5  15.6  11.1
Machinery  8.1  14.4  5.4  2.6
Transport  12.3  4.7  4.5  2.3
Instruments  6.4  11.9  6.5  2.5
Furniture  26.5  13.9  1.2  1.5
ource:  EUROSTT,  CtMEXT database.
Table 5: Exports  to EU Under Outward  Processing  Regime
Total 1993  Share of OPT in absolute  increase  in exports  to
l______________  (ECU million)  EU,  1989-1993 (%)
|6 CEECs  3,600  26l
|MENA  500  4
Source: EUROSTAT,  COMEXT  database.
The data reveal clearly that the CEECs are well on the way to exploiting  their geographic
proximity to the EU, which in conjunction  with their relatively  low wages and significant  stocks of
human  capital makes them formiidable  competitors  for the MENA region.  The geographic  advantage
that the MENA region used to have-because Eastern Europe  was effectively  closed to open exchange
with the West--has  now disappeared. MENA must now compete  head-to-head  with the CEECs.  This
is indeed a challenge,  not least because  relative labor costs in the CEECs and MENA are not that
different. Per capita incomes in the CEECs--one  proxy for such costs--are  close to MENA levels
(Table 6).  The fact that Eastern Europe is able to exploit sub-contracting  of manufacturing  products
21for export to the European  Union in a much greater degree than most MENA countries is relevant
here.  Under  just-in-time management  practices, the availability  of adequate  service links (transport,
harbor services, customs operations,  telecommunications  ...) is fundamental  for the decision on where
to outsource. Many MENA countries (particularly  those around the Mediterranean)  can become
competitive  locations for outsourcing  by European  companies  once access  to efficient  producer
services  is made available. This requires significant  changes  in regulatory regimes and investment
policies to enhance  the contestability  of markets.
Table 6:  Per Capita  Incomes  Relative  to Germany
Country  Value 1992  Relative  to
Germany  (%)
Egypt  650  2.8
Morocco  1,050  4.6
Jordan  1,130  4.9
Tunisia  1,760  7.6
Algeria  1,850  8.0
Saudi Arabia  7,640  33.2
Israel  13,460  58.4
United  Arab Emirates  22,640  98.3
Turkey  2,040  8.9
Romania  1,170  5.1
Bulgaria  1,410  6.1
Poland  1,950  8.4
China  480  2.1
Source: World Bank, World Development  Report, 1994.
4.  The Uruguay  Round:  WTO Rules  and Disciplines
The economic  substance  of the direction of the required changes in trade policies and
institutions  is clear; the question is how to create a constituency  that favors reforms and makes them
politically  feasible and self-sustaining. Although the primary constraint in this connection  is clearly
the existence  (or rather the absence)  of internal  support, external institutional  mechanisms  can be
22helpful. Two options that can be pursued are stronger linkages  with the EU and "deep integration"
into the WTO.
The implications  of the WTO and the liberalization  package  agreed to under the Uruguay
round can be divided into two parts: (1) the impact on the world economy  through induced  changes in
demand  and supply of goods and services; and (2) the impact  on trade policies and institutions in
Member  countries.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess quantitatively  the impact  of the
Uruguay round and full implementation  of the WTO agreements  on the MENA region. This is a
difficult  exercise in any event, as many of the agreements  cannot be quantified. Much of the WTO
relates to transparency,  to improved  enforcement  of obligations,  to rules of procedure. Numerical
simulations  of the impact  of the Uruguay round can cover only aspects  that  can be quantified. The
most important  of these are agricultural liberalization,  reduction in tariffs for industrial products and
the integration  of textiles and clothing.
The most comprehensive  and detailed evaluation  of the Uruguay round using a computable
general equilibrium  model and that distinguishes  the MENA region is Harrison, Rutherford  and Tarr
(1995).5 They find that the impact  effect on MENA may be negative, reflecting  the erosion of rents
created  by the MFA and the likely rise in global food prices following  reduction in export subsidies in
OECD countries. In the "steady  state", however, once capital stocks have adjusted, the region is
predicted  to benefit from the global liberalization,  increasing  aggregate  welfare  by up to $1.3 billion
per year (this does not take into account possible adjustment  costs).  A key finding from the Harrison
et al. study, as well as many other CGE efforts, is that the impact  of the Round is relatively  small,
and that very much depends on the policy stance that is maintained  by governments. Given the high
average rates of protection  that will continue to exist in many MENA countries after the Uruguay
round outcome is fully implemented,  most of the potential  gains that can be realized will come from
further liberalization  of domestic, not foreign, markets.  The commitments  made by the MENA
countries in the Uruguay  Round illustrate  that much remains  to be done in this regard.
5 See Goldin  and  Kherallah  (1994)  and Kirmani  (1994)  for qualitative  discussions  of agriculture  and textiles  and
clothing.
23Turning to the Uruguay round's impact  on trade policies and institutions, the WTO itself does
not embody  substantive  rules regarding government  policies--it  is simply a formal institutional
structure under whose auspices  Members negotiate  and implement  trade agreements. The rules are
contained  in the treaties it oversees (GATT, GATS, TRIPs).
GAIT-1994  Disciplines
Both policy and institutional  changes  are likely to be necessary  in many MENA countries to
fulfill WTO obligations. Major implications  include the following  (Hoekman, 1995a):
*  Trade policies and their implementation  must be nondiscriminatory. This encompasses  the
most-favored-nation  (MFN) and national  treatment principles. MFN requires  nondiscrimination
between all foreign products; national  treatment requires  that foreign products be treated identically  to
local competing  products as far as internal  indirect taxation  and equivalent  measures are concerned.
*  The use of quantitative  restrictions  is heavily circumscribed. The web of bilateral quantitative
restrictions  (QRs) imposed  under the MFA will gradually  be eliminated. While largely an issue
affecting OECD  countries, some countries in the MENA region  - e.g.,  Egypt -- maintain quantitative
import restrictions  for textiles  and clothing, and will thus be affected. QRs on agricultural imports
are prohibited; in principle  WTO Members may only use tariffs to restrict imports of agricultural
products, and all such tariffs are bound. 6
- Governments  must reduce support granted to agricultural  production, and export subsidies, if
any.  Developing  countries  have been granted some flexibility  in this connection,  e.g., input subsidies
are permitted as are export subsidies  related to marketing  services.
*  Developing  countries  that have a per capita GNP above  U.S. $1,000 become subject to
GATT's prohibition on export  subsidies  for industrial  products.
6 Quantitative  import  restrictions,  variable  import  levies,  minimum  import  prices,  discretionary  import  licensing,
non-tariff  measures  maintained  through  state  trading  enterprises,  voluntary  export  restraints  and similar  border
measures  are explicitly  prohibited  (Agreement  on Agriculture,  Article  4).
24*  Developing  country WTO members  must eliminate  all trade-related  investment  measures
(TRIMs)  such as local content requirements,  export performance  rules, etc., that violate GATT's
national  treatment principle  or its prohibition on QRs before 2000..
*  If trade measures  are imposed  for balance-of-payments  purposes, WTO rules require that
price-based  measures  such as tariffs be used in principle.
*  The basis for customs valuation  is to be the importer's invoice. However, developing
countries  that were not party to the 1979  (Tokyo round) Agreement  on customs valuation  may delay
implementation  of the Agreement  until 2000.  Specific  conditions  are required to be satisfied for
rejection  of the invoice by customs in determining  the magnitude  of duties  to be paid.  Developing
countries  which currently value goods on the basis of officially  established  minimum values  may
request  a reservation  to enable them to retain such values  on a limited and transitional  basis, subject
to the terms and conditions  required by the other WTO members.
°  The WTO's rules relating  to product standards and sanitary/phyto-sanitary  measures require
that new regulations  and conformity  assessment  procedures  be based on international  standards. An
enquiry  point must be created to answer questions  regarding product standards and sanitary or
phytosanitary  measures; applicable  control and inspection  procedures, quarantine,  pesticide  tolerance
and food additive  approval procedures; and risk assessment  methods used.  Similar questions
regarding  technical regulations  and conformity  assessment  procedures can be posed.
*  There are many requirements  concerning  the procedures  to be followed  with respect to the
imposition  of contingent  protection (safeguards,  countervailing  of subsidized  imports, and
antidumping). Space constraints  prohibit even a summary,  but the implications  for the institutions
that implement  such mechanisms  are significant.
GATS  Disciplines
*  MFN, national  treatment  and market access are the key policy elements  of the GATS.  MFN
is in principle a general obligation. The sectoral coverage  of national  treatment and market access
obligations is determined  by country  schedules. Six types of market access restrictions  are in
25principle  prohibited  under GATS. These consist of limitations  on: (i) the number  of service suppliers
allowed, (ii) the value of transactions  or assets, (iii) the total quantity of service output, (iv) the
number  of natural persons  that may be employed, (v) the type of legal entity through which a service
supplier is permitted to supply a service (e.g., branches  vs. subsidiaries  for banking),  and (vi)
participation  of foreign  capital in terms of a maximum  percentage  limit of foreign shareholding  or the
absolute  value of foreign investment.  Each GATS Member decides  (negotiates)  which service sectors
will be subject  to market access and national  treatment disciplines, and what measures  will be kept in
placefor that sector that violate  market access  and/or national  treatment, respectively.'
*  At least annually, Members must inform  the Council for Trade in Services  of the introduction
of new -- or changes to existing -- laws, regulations or administrative  guidelines which significantly
affect trade in services  covered by their specific commitments  ( national  treatment and market access).
e  An enquiry point must be established  to provide specific  information  to other Members on all
relevant measures  of general application  which affect the operation of the GATS.
e  Judicial, arbitral or administrative  tribunals or procedures  must exist which provide for
prompt, objective  and impartial  review of administrative  decisions  affecting  trade in services.
*  Measures  relating  to qualification  requirements  and procedures, technical  standards and
licensing requirements  may not unnecessarily  restrict trade in services; should be based on objective
and transparent  criteria; and not be more burdensome  than necessary  to ensure service quality.
MENA Commitments
Countries that were GATT-1947  signatories  are committed  to the various obligations noted
above. As far as tariffs are concerned, the main impact  concerns  the requirement  under the
Agreement  on Agriculture  to replace nontariff  barriers with tariffs. On the industrial side, the main
change is the requirement  that a schedule  of bound tariffs be presented, including not only tariffs, but
also "other fees and charges".  Post Uruguay  Round bound tariff commitments  for Egypt and Tunisia
7  See Hoekman (1995b)  for a more detailed discussion  of the GATS.
26are summarized  in Table 7.  The Table reveals that the difference between  bound rates and currently
applied rates are not great.  However, as noted earlier, tariff levels in the region remain high, both
absolutely--in  terms of generating  an anti-export  bias--and  relative to other parts of the developing
world.
Table 7:  Bound versus  Applied  Tariff Rates, Selected  Countries
GATT Member  Post-Uruguay  round bound average  Current applied average tariff rates
tariff rates (unweighted)  (unweighted)
Industry  Agriculture  Industry  Agriculture
Egypt  31  61  23  52
Tunisia  27  41  33  T  40
Source: Egyptian  data are from  Subramanian  (1995);  Tunisian  data are from the  WTO  Integrated  Database.
MENA countries  did little to open their service  markets in the Uruguay round. Commitments
are only substantial  in the area of hotel and restaurant services  (that is tourism-related  services),
although  in construction  and financial  services  these countries as a group scheduled  a higher than
average (as compared to the developing  country group) number of service activities in their offers
(Hoekman  and Primo-Braga,  1995). On average, the level and the degree of liberalization  provided
by the specific  commitments  of the Arab countries is less than that of developing  countries in general.
Overall, the immnediate  implications  of the GATS agreement  for domestic service providers in Arab
countries are quite limited. If one focuses, for example, on Egypt--the  Arab country with the highest
level of "no restrictions"  maintained  on market access and national  treatment (Table 8)--most offers
consist of binding the regulatory status quo for the sectors scheduled. The qualifications  are extensive
and include limitations  on the share of foreign  personnel  in foreign  controlled  enterprises (and even in
the overall wage bill in the case of maritime  transport), a maximum  of 49 percent of foreign capital in
several industries  (construction  and related  engineering  services, tourism projects in the Sinai region,
insurance),  economic  needs tests in the case of tourism, opening  of branches  by foreign banks and
27insurance  (e.g., new companies  should be able to work without "harmful"  competition  to existing
companies),  restrictions  on the operations  of representative  offices, etc.
Table 8: Sectoral  Coverage  of Specific Services  Commitments  (percent)
Large
High  Develop-  Selected  Arab Countries
income  All Other  ing
Members  Countries  Countries  Algeria  Bahrain  Egypt  Kuwait  Morocco  Tunisia
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Average  share of  53.3  15.1  29.6  0.65  2.58  16.77  28.39  23.23  8.39
sectors listed
No restrictions  28.0  6.4  10.0  0.48  1.9  7.9  7.1  6.5  1.5
maintained  as a share
of total possible
Source: Hoekman  and Primo-Braga  (1995).
TRIPs
Protection of intellectual  property rights is important  for a number  of reasons, including
attracting inward FDI.  The TRIPs Agreement  requires protection  of tradernarks  (to last at least 7
years; equal treatment  to be given to service and trade marks; prohibition on compulsory  licensing),
geographical  indications  (prohibition  on indications  that mislead or constitute 'unfair' competition),
industrial  designs and layout designs of integrated  circuits (duration  of protection  at least ten years).
In the area of copyright, Members are required to comply with the substantive  provisions  of the Beme
convention  (1971), with the exception  of its obligations  regarding the protection  of moral rights,
provide for rental rights and protection  against  unauthorized  recording  of live performances.
Computer software is to be protected  as a literary work under the Beme Convention. Copyright
protection  is to last for at least 50 years. As regards  patent protection, all signatories  must comply
with the substantive  provisions  of the Paris Convention  (1967). Patent protection  is to be provided
for almost all inventions,  and is to be of at least 20 years duration after the date of filing.
IP laws must also be enforced, which requires that customs authorities  apply--and  the judicial
system enforces--the  laws.  Enforcement  and dispute  settlement  procedures  are spelled out in some
28detail. Enforcement  procedures  under  national  laws must permit effective  action against any act of
infringement  of IP rights.  Signatories  are to allow criminal procedures  and penalties  to be applied in
cases of wilful trademark  counterfeiting  or copyright  piracy on a commercial  scale, with penalties
sufficiently  large to constitute  an effective  deterrent.  Developing  countries  have 5 years to implement
the provisions  of the TRIPs agreement, with the exception  of its national  treatment and MFN
requirements. If a developing  country must extend patent protection  to areas of technology  that are
currently not protectable  (e.g., pharmaceuticals  or agricultural chemicals),  the application  of TRIPs
disciplines  to these areas may be delayed for another five years, bringing the total to ten.
Maximizing  the Potential  Benefits  of WTO  Membership
Implementing  all the rules and principles of the WTO will help reduce the extent to which the
trade policy regime distorts incentives. But WTO membership  is not a panacea. Full consistency
with WTO requirements  is neither necessary  nor sufficient  to ensure good trade policy.  A great need
remains for careful institutional  design.  While adherence  to WTO rules and principles can clearly  be
of great value to MENA governments  in terns  of increasing  the credibility of trade policy reform,
many of the WTO's disciplines  are optional, either in the sense that members  have discretion
regarding the extent to which they apply (i.e., their coverage), or have a choice whether to invoke
them. A useful distinction  can be made between  the possibilities  that exist to opt out of disciplines  that
are 'good' in that abiding by them is likely to be efficiency  and welfare enhancing, and the
possibilities  that exist for opting to use measures  that are permitted, but are likely to be detrimental  to
efficiency  and welfare (Hoekman, 1995a). Examples  of the first category of 'options' are the
magnitude  and restrictiveness  of tariff bindings, participation  in the government  procurement
agreement, and the specific commitments  made under the GATS.  Examples  of the second set of
'options' are the possibility  of demanding  'special and differential' treatment; not binding  tariffs at
applied rates; the mandate  to implement  antidumping  and countervailing  duty legislation; the option of
using trade barriers on balance  of payments grounds; the possibility  of negotiating  free trade
29agreements  that do not entail free trade; and the freedom to severely limit the extent to which service
markets are opened to foreign competition.
The extent to which the WTO's 'options' are invoked  can have a large impact  on  the
incentive  structure facing firms and consumers. Limiting  the extent to which the 'bad' options are
exercised and maximizing  the extent to which the 'good' options are exploited  is a matter for which
each Member  Government  bears the primary responsibility. Indeed, there is some degree of
asymmetry  here, as the adoption  of the 'good' options is subject to pressure from trading partners,
whereas  there is no such pressure with respect to the 'bad' ones.  Autonomous  decisions regarding  the
trade policy stance  to be maintained  remain extremely  important in determining  the credibility of
reform efforts.  Such credibility can be increased  very substantially  through membership  of the WTO
if the Government  so desires.  But this requires a conscious  and autonomous  decision  to do so.
Actions that will enhance  the credibility of the Government's trade policy stance include the
following:
*  Bind all tariffs at applied rates.  If tariffs are lowered, they should be automatically
bound at the new applied rate.
*  Refrain from invoking  GATT's traditional "special  and differential"  treatment
provisions. Full application  of the agreements  on customs valuation, standards, trade-related
investment  measures,  as well as participation  in the government  procurement  agreement,  and
adherence  to the general rules relating to regional integration  will increase the relevance  of the WTO.
*  Design safeguard  legislation  in a way that minimizes  the scope for easy re-imposition
of protection  and ensures that the economy-wide  impact is considered  before protection is imposed.
*  Enhance  the transparency  of the policy formation  process by giving an independent
body the responsibility  of evaluating  the likely economic  impact  of proposed  trade policies, and
monitor their effects ex post.  Such a body could advise the government  on the effects of specific
trade policy on competition and national  welfare; and could be required  to prepare and publish a
regular, comprehensive  report of the effects of trade and investment  policies.  The WTO's
requirements  concerning  the Trade Policy Review  Mechanism  already imply that periodically  a
30comprehensive  description and analysis of the trade policy regime must be made. It makes good
sense to build upon this requirement  and institutionalize  such a domestic monitoring capacity.
0  Undertake  efforts to minimize 'red tape' associated  with regulatory and customs-
related  procedures. Administrative  burdens raise costs for traders, and create uncertainty  and the
opportunities  for rent-seeking. Mutual recognition  of standards and testing/conformity  assessment
procedures  can greatly facilitate  trade.  Reduction  of the number of tariff bands and the number of
documents  (in principle  a single administrative  document  should be used) can help speed up customs
clearance  and reduce uncertainty.
*  Expand  the scope of specific  commitments  on services  under GATS auspices. As
under the GATT, an important  potential  benefit of the GATS is the "anchor"  effect.  By binding its
policies in the GATS, a government  is in a better position  to resist demands  from influential  interest
groups to alter these policies in the future.  The GATS imposes costs on "backsliding"  -- i.e.,
adopting more restrictive  policies for services  that are bound -- by requiring countries  to negotiate  the
withdrawal  of specific commitments. In this context, even an offer to bind the status quo has a value
to the extent that it improves  the transparency  of the regulatory  regime and makes "backsliding"  less
likely.  The lack of competition  in services is an important  factor underlying  the difficulties  of many
firms in MENA countries  to compete  on world markets. This raises the costs of services such as
finance, insurance,  transport, handling  and storage of goods, which are often much higher than in
neighboring  countries  or nations with which MENA countries  compete. Similarly, the quality of the
services provided  is generally  lower.  Port services such as loading  and unloading  of containers  on
ships, handling of containers,  storage and warehousing  are often in the hands of monopolies.
5.  The Potential  Role of an EU Agreement
As mentioned  earlier, an important  factor constraining  policy reform in a number of MENA
countries  relates to the absence  of political support for opening up the economy and a perception  on
the part of governments  that rapid liberalization  could give rise to social unrest.  The latter in
particular  is reflected in a preference  for cautious,  gradual reform. The problem with such an
31approach  is that it may be too slow, inducing  the private sector to take a "wait and see" attitude.
Ongoing  developments  in the external environment  (globalization,  the implementation  of the Uruguay
round, the coming on stream of the CEECs and the former Soviet Union, the rapid growth of Asian
economies)  suggest reform efforts must be accelerated. Closer relations with the EU may help
overcome  some of the political  constraints  that may have affected  reform efforts in a number of the
MENA countries.
The Commission  of the European  Communities  has proposed to negotiate  a Euro-
Mediterranean  Economic  Area with the MENA countries. This would greatly expand  the extent of
cooperation  between  the EU and MENA, which currently is governed  by cooperation  agreements
agreed to in the 1970s  in conjunction  with periodic financial protocols. The Commission  has been
authorized  to negotiate  agreements  with the Maghreb countries and Israel covering institutionalization
of political dialogue;  free trade in industrial products; reciprocal  liberalization  of trade in agriculture
and services; and expansion  of the scope of technical, economic, social, cultural and financial
cooperation. Negotiations  with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Israel are expected  to be completed  in
1995. An Agreement  was initialled with Tunisia in April 1995, and agreement  to establish  a customs
union with Turkey was reached in early 1995. The EU is also engaged in talks with the GCC on a
FTA, but this appears to be conditional  upon the GCC achieving  a customs union (Zarrouk, 1995).
The basic objectives  of the Euro-Med  proposal are to achieve  reciprocal free trade in
manufactured  goods by 2010; preferential  and reciprocal access  for agricultural  products of interest to
both parties; and free trade among the Mediterranean  countries. This is to be achieved  gradually.
The Commission's  Communication  states that "in order to be able to enter progressively  into free
trade with the Union and to take on board a wide range of trade-related  Community regulations
(customs, standards, competition,  intellectual  property  protection, liberalization  of services, free
capital movements,  etc.) ...  Mediterranean countries  ...  insist on four fundamental aspects  ...: the
need for long transitional  mechanisms  and secure safeguards;  the need to obtain improved  access for
32their agricultural exports; the need for increased financial  flows ... [and] the possibility  to count on
the Community's help to accelerate  the modernization  of their social and economic  systems."8
The EU has concluded  Association  Agreements  (called "Europe Agreements")  with Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic. A brief summary of their
contents is helpful in understanding  the possible content and implications  of the Euro-Med proposal.
At the time of writing it was still unclear what the content of agreements  with Mediterranean
countries would be, but they are likely to be similar to the Europe Agreements. The Europe
Agreements  are unlimited in duration, and are to be implemented  over a ten year period, in two
stages of five years each.  They have four main elements:  (1) free movement  of goods; (2) movement
of workers, establishment,  and supply of services; (3) payments, capital, competition  and
approximation  of laws; and (4) economic  and financial  cooperation.
Free  Movement  of Goods  Reciprocal  free trade in goods is a key objective  of the
agreements.  Upon entry into force of the interim agreements  (March 1992 for the Visegrad
countries), the EU abolished  tariffs on "non-sensitive"  industrial products. Duties on "sensitive"
products are to be reduced  gradually over 2 to 4 years, depending  on the product. For most MENA
countries  this is not an issue, as industrial exports are mostly unconstrained. The CEECs negotiated
different transition schedules  vis-a-vis imports from the EU.  Poland committed itself to eliminate
tariffs on about 30% of its imports from the EU in 1992, and to abolish  the remainder  over a seven
year transition  period.. An exception  was made for motor vehicles, where liberalization  will take 10
years.  Hungary agreed to liberalize 12-13%  of its imports  during 1992-95,  another 20% between
1995 and 1997, and the rest between 1995 and 2001, in steps of one-sixth  per year.  This suggests
some flexibility  over transition  modalities.  Reports on Tunisia's draft agreement  suggest a 12 year
transition, with 60 percent of imports  to be liberalized  within 5 years; the remainder  over the
subsequent  7 years; and a negative  excluded  products.
8 'Strengthening  the Mediterranean  Policy  of the European  Union:  Establishing  a Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership,"  Communication  from  the  Commission  to the Council  and the Parliament,  October  1994.
33Quotas  must be abolished  by all partner countries  upon entry into force of the agreements.
Exceptions  are allowed  for a limited number of products during a transition  period of up to 8 years.
Major products in this category are motor vehicles. In general, quotas are maintained  that increase
annually  during the transition. QRs on imports  of textiles and clothing from eastern Europe were
eased considerably  in the early 1990s, partly in the context of the prolongation  of the Fourth Multi-
Fiber Agreement  to 1992. During the negotiations  of the association  agreements  quotas were
expanded  further by over 60% on average for the Visegrad countries in comparison  to the 1991 MFA
quota limits, and the number of restrained  categories  reduced. Quotas for outward-processing  traffic
were increased  by a similar amount  and duties eliminated  on products falling within the categories
listed in the annex  to EU Regulation  636/82.  Quotas are to expand  by about 5% a year during 1992-
97.  Quota and duty-free trade in textiles  and clothing is to become effective  after a transition period
of five years, that is, on January 1, 1997. A textiles quota dismantling  protocol was to be negotiated
after the conclusion  of the Uruguay Round, the goal being to phase out quotas in half the time agreed
to in the multilateral  context.
For agricultural  products under common  market organizations,  with the important  exception  of
cereals, reductions  of up to 75% of variable  levies and tariffs will be granted, subject  to tariff quotas
growing at about 8% per year.  The most frequent formula is a 60% reduction of variable levies and
tariffs, phased-in  with three annual steps of 20% each (e.g., for beef, poultry, lamb, pork and dairy
products). For a number  of products not covered  by common  market organizations  (and subject to
lower fixed tariffs), e.g., fruits and vegetables,  duty or levy reductions  of some 30% to 50% will be
phased-in  over a period of five years.  Duty free quotas will expand  by one-third  to one-half  by
January 1996. The agreements  provide  for a review  of the agricultural  concessions  granted by the
EU, taking into account the results of the Uruguay  Round and the eventual  reform of the CAP.  This
is the main area where significant  liberalization  will not occur.
The CEECs may temporarily  protect infant industries  or sectors under economic  restructuring,
subject to a number of conditions  (tariffs are not to exceed 25  %, EU producers are to be given a
margin of preference,  quotas are not to exceed 15% of the total industrial imports from the EU, and
34actions  may only be taken within three years of liberalization  of market access  and are not to last
more than five years).  In all such cases the Association  Council is to be informed  prior to action
being taken, and such actions are conditional  on the issue not being resolved in the Council.
Movement  of Workers,  Establishment,  and Supply  of Services  Very little was agreed in terms
of liberalizing  movement  of workers. The main EU-wide commitment  is for national treatment of
legally  resident Central and East European  workers, spouses and children with respect to working
conditions, access  to labor markets, and cumulation  of social security benefits earned by nationals of
associated  countries in different EU member countries. EU member countries will grant free entry
and national  treatment  to all investment  from associated  countries, except in air and inland water
transport and maritime cabotage; Associated  countries  will also grant free entry and national
treatment to EU firms, but have been granted phase-in  periods for certain sectors or activities.  For
industrial and commercial  sectors undergoing  restructuring  programs, of an 'infant industry' nature,
or facing elimination  or a drastic reduction in total market share, temporary entry restrictions and
policies violating  national  treatment can be introduced  by CEECs during the first 5 years of the
transition period. In devising  and applying  such measures,  preferential treatment should be granted,
if possible, to EU firms.
T'he  Europe Agreements  require free mobility of capital and unrestricted  repatriation of profits
and initial capital  of firms that establish  in partner countries. Payment flows (current account
transactions)  resulting from liberalization  commitments  under the agreements  are also to be
unrestricted. Full convertibility  and liberalization  of capital account  transactions  are longer term
objectives,  although  no time frame is mentioned  for their realization. Associated  countries are
committed not to introduce  new foreign exchange  restrictions  after the fifth year, but remain free to
apply restrictions  on outward investment  by nationals. More generally, the EU is to help establish a
legal framework  favoring foreign  direct investment  and ensuring investor  protection. Cross-border
supply of services is to be liberalized  progressively. No time frame is established  for the
liberalization  of supply of services, nor is the achievement  of freedom of supply of services
mentioned  explicitly as an ultimate objective.
35Competition  Policy and Approximation  of Laws  The Agreements  require the basic competition  rules
of the EU to be adopted  by the associated  countries. These pertain to collusive behavior, abuse of
dominant  position, public undertakings  and competition-distorting  state aid (Articles 85, 86, 90 and 92
of the EEC Treaty), insofar as they affect trade between  the Community and each CEEC.  Until
implementing  rules are adopted  by the Association  Council, GATT rules with respect to
countervailing  of subsidies apply.  State-aid,  compatible  with EU rules for disadvantaged  regions
(Article 92.3(a) Treaty of Rome), can be applied to the entire territories of the associated  states
during the first five years.  The agreements  also provide for enhanced  transparency  of state aids, each
party agreeing  to provide annual reports on the total amount and distribution of the aid given. 9
Associated  countries  agreed to pursue gradual harmonization  of their legal systems with EU
laws.  Areas mentioned  include customs, company, and banking  law, accounting  and corporate tax
laws, intellectual  property rights, workers' safety, financial  services, competition  policy, consumer
protection,  indirect taxation,  plant and animal  health standards, food legislation,  and other technical,
safety and environmental  standards.'" Economic  and technical  assistance  will cover virtually every
aspect of economic  policy, including  industry, agriculture, mining, energy, defense  industry
restructuring, transport, tourism, financial services, investment  promotion, industrial standards and
conformity  assessment,  water management,  telecommunications,  postal services  and broadcasting,
monetary  policy, money laundering, regional  development,  social cooperation,  small and medium-
sized enterprises, information  and communications,  drug policies, and public administration  (see also
approximation  of laws above). Collaboration  will also extend  to education  and training, research and
development  and cultural  matters.
I State  aids  to agriculture  and  fisheries  are excluded  from  competition  policy  disciplines  (Articles  42-43  EEC
apply),  and separate  rules  are to be implemented  by the Association  council  within  three  years  for the steel
sector. The  latter  are to be based  upon  Articles  65-66  of the Treaty  of Paris  (ECSC),  and make  allowance  for
state  aids  permitted  under  ECSC  auspices.
10  On standards,  objectives  are to seek  greater  compliance  with EU technical  regulations/standards  for products,
promote  the use of EU  standards  and conformity  assessment  procedures,  achieve  agreement  on mutual
recognition  in these  fields,  and encourage  CEEC  participation  in the work  of EU standards-writing  bodies.
36Implications  for MENA
A key benefit of negotiating  an agreement  with the EU along the foregoing lines is that it
provides a policy blueprint to which a MENA government  can credibly commit itself.  Credibility
results both from the formal nature of a treaty, and the availability  of financial  and technical
assistance  from the EU to help implement  the agreement. The Commission  has proposed to increase
its financial  assistance  to the region to ECU 5.5 billion for 1995-99,  complemented  by another ECU
5.5 billion from the European Investment  Bank.  Although it remains to be seen what levels of
assistance  will finally be approved  by the Council, there is a recognition  in Brussels  that greater
financial  flows will be required to help future partner countries implement  Association  Agreements.
Not much should  be expected  of the EU in terms of significant  immediate  improvement  in
market access  for products that are sensitive. As far as clothing is concerned,  MENA countries
currently have almost quota free access.  Access to EU agricultural markets will be difficult  to
improve significantly  in the short run.  The CEEC experience  in this domain illustrates  that obtaining
better access  will run into strong opposition  by vested interests in the EU.  Improved  access  to EU
markets is in any event not the main benefit.  The main potential  pay off of an agreement  with the
EU comes from the reduction in barriers to imports and inward foreign direct investment  in both
goods and service sectors in partner countries. The CEECs agreed to allow establishment  by EU-
based firms in virtually  all sectors of economic  activity. Although  transitional  arrangements  and
temporary exceptions  were negotiated,  the number  of sectors excluded  indefinitely  are very limited
(largely restricted  to agricultural  land, natural resources and historical  monuments). The arguments  in
favor of such an all-encompassing  approach, with a very short negative  list of exceptions, are very
strong.  In many sectors--both  goods and services--establishment  is the most direct method  of
enhancing  competition  and efficiency.
Adoption  of EU policies and regulations in the areas noted previously  will have major
implications  for MENA countries. Adoption of internal  EU practices  makes practical sense as this
will help attract investment,  facilitate  exports and enhance competition  on domestic markets. The
increasing  trend towards  more stringent product standards  and regulations  that are applied on an EU-
37wide basis enhances  the 'export pay-off' of harmonizing  domestic product standards  as much as
possible with those of the EU.  The same applies regarding  the use of EU customs procedures  and
documentation. Care must be taken that the adoption of regulations/directives  does not conflict with a
country's comparative  advantage,  however, specifically  as regards environmental  and social policies.
An important  caveat  concerns  the potential costs of trade diversion that an FTA with the EU
could entail. If external  tariffs on products originating  in the rest of world are not lowered
concurrently,  a FTA may have large opportunity  costs (Rutherford  et al., 1993). As noted earlier,
the best strategy in this connection  is if an EU-link is used as part of broader effort to liberalize  trade
and investment  regimes. Insofar as credibility  problems exist, a FTA with the EU may do more to
convince  the private sector that planned reform efforts will be implemented  than unilateral efforts.  A
supporting  policy in this connection  should also be to critically  review the rationale for existing
regional  agreements  within the Arab world. As noted in Section  2, many MENA countries  have
concluded  preferential  trade agreements  with one another. These agreements  should be either
abolished  or converted into full-fledged  FTAs.
6.  Concluding Remarks
Despite the progress that has been made in recent years to reform policies, on average the
MENA region remains more inward oriented than many other parts of the world.  Anti-export  biases
are strong, reflecting  not only tariff policies  but also the regulatory burdens and administrative  red
tape that confronts businesses. State intervention  in the economy  often remains  pervasive. Only by
allowing  greater competition  on domestic markets--through  reduction  of barriers to imports and
exports and by allowing foreign  direct investment  to occur--will  the countries in the region be able to
achieve  sustainable  real growth.  So far it has proven difficult  for a number  of countries in the region
to implement  far-reaching  reform of trade and investment  policies.  External  developments  suggest
that in the foreseeable  future many--if  not most--of MENA' comparator/competitor  countries will be
more open, more private sector-friendly  and more dynamic. The CEECs illustrate  the challenge--not
38just in terms  of being competitors,  but also in terms of what must be done.  Similar efforts are well
underway in Latin America and Asia.
There are two key issues for MENA Governments  as far as trade policy is concerned:  (i)
adopting a trade policy regime that fosters integration  into the world economy; and (2) establishing  a
set of institutions  that make this trade policy stance a credible  one.  Without the latter, little may
emerge from a trade liberalization  effort in terms of private sector supply response. An important
benefit of both the WTO and the EU option in this connection  are their potential  role as a
commitment  device. The GATT/WTO  provides a cheap and effective  mechanism  to lock in trade
policy reforms and improve the transparency  of policy implementation. By adopting  and abiding by
the rules of the game for the administration  of trade laws and policies, current problems associated
with bureaucratic  red tape can diminish significantly.  By binding tariffs at applied levels, the scope
for domestic  firms to lobby directly for an increase in a specific  tariff is greatly reduced, if not
eliminated. This will force firms to go through the GATT-sanctioned  mechanisms  for temporary
safeguard  protection. If well-designed  these will not encourage  direct rent seeking  expenditures  or
constitute  a disincentive  for firms to undertake  the investment  and adjustment  efforts needed to
enhance  their productivity.
A problem associated  with the WTO is that its loopholes  may substantially  reduce the potential
beneficial 'credibility  effect'.  Developing  countries  are permitted  to bind only a portion of their
tariffs under GATT, often maximum  or 'ceiling' rates that exceed applied rates.  Developing
countries also 'benefit' from special and differential  treatment, which usually implies an exemption
from certain rules or principles. Investment  policies in general (as opposed to TRIMs) are not
covered  by the WTO.  GATT allows for antidumping,  a policy for which the economic  justification is
almost nonexistent,  which in turn reduces the relevance  of GATT rules with respect to safeguard
actions. It is weak on preferential  rules of origin, and allows trade restrictions to be imposed for
balance of payments  reasons rather than encouraging  the use of alternative  macroeconomic
instruments. Disciplines  on public procurement  practices  only apply to those countries that want to be
subject to them.
39An agreement  with the EU to establish  a free trade and investment  area may help to offset
many of the WTO's weaknesses  and also help overcome  existing resistance  to reform. An EU link
can provide  assurances  to investors  that although  progress will be somewhat  slower (more gradual)
than in Eastern Europe, MENA governments  are committed  to far-reaching  integration  with the EU.
The EU can offer a more binding and more credible road map than the WTO.  Financial  and
technical  assistance  from the EU is available  to ease the process of transition and the adoption  of EU
norms. An agreement  with the EU is not a panacea  either, however.  In many dimensions  an
agreement  will only require non-discrimination  or national  treatment, i.e., the obligation  not to
discriminate  between  foreign (EU) and domestic firms.  This will often not be enough to ensure that a
MENA partner is attractive  for inward FDI.  It is important  that existing policies that unnecessarily
reduce the competitiveness  of domestic firms are reduced or eliminated,  including  trade and other
barriers to competition  that affect non-EU firms.  The latter is important  to limit the trade diversion
costs of an agreement  with the EU.  Indeed, governments  should be strongly encouraged  to reduce
tariffs and other barriers to trade against the rest of the world at the same time, and at the same pace,
as barriers are reduced vis-a-vis EU suppliers. The additional  adjustment  costs of doing so are
limited, while the potential gains from liberalization  will be greatly enhanced.
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41Annex  Table  1:  Average  Unweighted  Tariffs  of Countries  Undertaking
Liberalization  Efforts,  mid-1980s and  early  1990s
Applied:  Applied:  oUsy
Country  Mid-1980s  Early  9rund
1990s  Binding
Bangladesh  (1989, 1993)  94.0  50.0  NA
India  (1990, 1993)  128.0  71.0  52.6
Pakistan  (1987, 1992)  68.9  64.8  NA
Sri Lanka  (1985, 1992)  31.0  25.0  28.3
Cote D'Ivoire  (1984, 1989)  26.0  33.0  NA
Nigeria  (1984, 1990)  35.0  32.7  NA
Argentina  (1988, 1992)  29.4  12.2  20.3
Brazil  (1987, 1992)  51.0  21.0  26.8
Chile  (1984, 1991)*  15.0  11.0  20.0
Colombia  (1984, 1992)  61.0  12.0  11.8
Costa  Rica (1985, 1992)  53.0  15.0  NA
Mexico (1986, 1991)  22.6  13.1  13.7
Peru  (1984, 1992)  27.0  17.0  26.8
Venezuela  (1989, 1991)  37.0  19.0  15.5
China  (1986,  1992)  38.1  43.0  ....
Indonesia  (1985, 1990)  27.0  22.0  21.3
South  Korea  (1984, 1992)  24.0  10.1  12.7
Malaysia  (1985, 1993)  NA  14.0  15.7
Egypt  (1989, 1993)  47.0  34.0  36.1
Jordan  (1987, 1994)  33.4  30.5  ...
Morocco  (1983, 1990)  36.1  23.4  NA
Tunisia  (1987, 1990)  32.5  28.5  29.7
Uniform rates.
NA  Not available.
...  Not a GATT member as of April 1995.
Dates in parentheses refer to the first 2 columns.  Post-Uruguay round refers to the date of full
implementation of Uruguay round tariff commitments, generally January  1999.
Source:  Dean et al. (1994) and World Bank.
42Annex Table 2:  Share of Textiles  and Clothing  in Total Exports  to EU 1989 - 1993
(ECU million and percentage)
1989  1993
Value  Share  Value  l  Share
CEECs  1,278  10.7  3,325  16.6
MENA  1,946  7.3  3,571  12.1
Turkey  1,813  32.9  2,948  45.1
Morocco  829  31.1  1,394  43.7
Tunisia  733  37.1  1,360  54.7
Egypt  52  2.1  151  6.8
Jordan  1.6  1.8  6.4  2.4
Lebanon  16  16.1  24  36.3
Israel  257  8.5  358  10.7
UAE  49  3.2  219  26.4
China  1,623  17.9  4,133  21.2
Memo:
EU Imports  19,779  31,205
MENA Share  9.8  11.4
CEEC Share  6.5  10.7
Annex Table 3: Exports to EU Under Outward  Processing  Customs  Regime  (ECU thousand)
Leather  Clothing  Clay/  Machin  Trans-  Furni-  Total
l__________  products  Glass  ery  port  ture
Jordan  1  17  0  3  0  0  27
Lebanon  3  0  259  14  0  7  380
Syria  0  0  124  506  0  0  632
Tuisia  12,760  224,010  15  27,286  2,894  58  274,877
UAE  56  2,242  2,952  482  9,396  50  15,731
Morocco  13,001  169,732  2  13,328  519  554  200,922
Israel  95  42  493  1,898  104  0  4,162
Egypt  0  527  0  1,403  171  108  2,638
5 CEEC  305,478  2,409,770  13,190  396,891  70,121  166,832  3,577,955
MENA  29,516  396,747  3,845  46,665  14,950  781  503,347
Source:  EU COMEXT  database.
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